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Internet, Television and Social Capital:  
The effect of ‘screen time’ on social capital  
 
Abstract 
Social capital theory as it was developed in the 1990s assumed that face-to-face interaction is a 
crucial requirement for the development of generalized trust and other pro-social attitudes and 
behaviors. Television and other electronic media were therefore dismissed as having a potentially 
negative impact on social capital development. Based on an analysis of high-quality data and a 
rich variety of social capital indicators in the General Social Survey 2012 we assess the impact of 
two broad categories of screen time – internet and television – on both attitudinal and behavioral 
components of social capital. The results show that while watching television is either unrelated 
or negatively related to a range of social capital indicators, there is usually a positive relation 
between internet use (in various forms) and social capital indicators. This direct comparison of 
the impact of internet and television usage on social capital indicators in a nationally 
representative study challenges the expectation that television and other digital technologies 
would have a similar negative impact on social capital. The findings suggest that internet-based 
activities clearly play a positive role in the development of social capital despite the lack of in-
person interaction, and the concluding discussion reviews avenues for future research to tease out 
causal mechanisms in the production of social capital in the digital age.  
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Introduction 
The concept of screen time suggests that we can consider various forms of electronic 
communication indiscriminately, since they likely have similar effects on social phenomena 
(Sisson et al., 2010). Based on the literature on social capital and social cohesion, researchers 
often assume that the effects of screen time will be predominantly negative. Social capital theory 
as it was developed in the 1990s was strongly pessimistic about the impact of television on the 
presence of social capital in US society. According to Putnam (2000), the proliferation of 
television is one of the main causes for the decline of social capital in the United States. Since 
that time, the videomalaise argument has been much debated (Norris, 1996), and qualified to a 
large extent. Prior (2007) argues that watching entertainment programs in a commercially 
dominated high-choice television environment might be associated with negative effects, but the 
opposite holds for information-seeking television watching behavior. From the late 1990s on, 
however, authors have applied arguments about the impact of television to internet use as well. In 
most of the social capital literature that is inspired by research of Putnam and other authors, the 
prevailing idea remains that electronic media will promote a couch potato syndrome, thus 
reducing ‘real’, i.e., face-to-face social contact. 
A main concern regarding computer-mediated communication’s social potential in the 
social capital literature is that it allows only a very limited and superficial form of human 
interaction. A main reason for this pessimism was the lack of rich communication cues that 
accompany face-to-face encounters: 
‘The poverty of social cues in computer-mediated communication inhibits personal 
collaboration and trust, especially when the interaction is anonymous and not nested is a 
wider social context. Experiments that compare face-to-face and computer-mediated 
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communication confirm that the richer the medium of communication, the more sociable, 
personal, trusting, and friendly the encounter’ (Putnam, 2000, 175, 176). 
 
Most of the social capital literature regarded face-to-face communication as a privileged form of 
human interaction, which encourages the development of pro-social attitudes and behavioral 
patterns. In contrast, the more recent literature suggests that in spite of the lack of face-to-face 
interaction, internet-based forms of communication can have very strong networking effects 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2011; Kittilson & Dalton, 2011). 
Much of this research however is focused on social media, which by definition involve an 
element of establishing networks and exchanging communication and information (Jiang & de 
Bruijn, 2014). With the current analysis, we do not wish to focus just on one specific form of 
internet-based communication, but we include a very broad measurement of internet use. The 
question therefore arises whether all these forms of ‘screen time’ really have the same, negative, 
effects as was often assumed in the social capital literature. The rapid technological and social 
transformation of the past decade renders it necessary to revisit the claims made in the early 
social capital literature with more contemporary data. 
The main question that motivates this study is whether, in the current digital era, media 
and computer-mediated forms of communication still have the same effect on social capital as 
was documented in some of the earlier studies. To investigate this overarching question, the 
research design of this study aims to address two related research questions. First, is the holistic 
concept of screen time a meaningful concept in terms of the effect of different kinds of screen 
time on social capital? To address this question, we break the screen time concept into smaller 
constitutive parts in order to better understand the relationship between digitalized media and 
social capital. Second, if we do find differences between these components, do screen time 
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activities that are more interactive in nature have a more positive effect on social capital? Based 
on the higher interactive potential of online activities in comparison to traditional television 
viewing, we would expect that the effect of online activities on social capital would be more 
positive than the effect of television viewing. It has to be noted in this regard that we focus 
exclusively on social capital effects outside the realm of internet communication itself, as this 
allows us to have a critical look at some of the main statements in the social capital literature. 
Self-evidently, social capital can be embedded in the internet-based communication itself (Appel 
et al., 2014), but investigating this phenomenon would require a totally different research design.  
Self-evidently, there is and has been a huge academic debate on how to define social 
capital (Fine, 2010). Some authors have argued that interventions of the political system to a large 
extent determine the level of social cohesion, while for other authors individual level 
determinants are more promising ways to shape trust and other dimensions of social cohesion. 
However, our research question mainly deals with individual level determinants, like watching 
television or being active on the internet. Given this pragmatic consideration, we have opted to 
follow the classic operationalization of social capital as closely as possible. As argued in the early 
social capital literature (Putnam 1995, 2000), the concept refers to a diverse array of social 
attitudes and pro-social behaviors that convey information about social connectedness and the 
quality of social life within a community. A variety of subsequent studies have shown that this 
social connectedness—as distinct from civic membership or political involvement—does have 
strong positive effects on the collective efficacy of a community (e.g., Sampson & Graif, 2009). 
While empirical social capital studies often narrow down this concept to just one or a number of 
indicators (e.g., generalized trust), in this article we aim to conduct a rigorous analysis of social 
capital theory by offering a more comprehensive measurement of social capital, including 
indicators that have not been routinely used in recent studies. 
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In this article, we first briefly review the opposing claims that have been made about the 
causal relation between television and internet on the one hand, and social capital on the other. 
Subsequently we present the data and methods used for the analysis, and we discuss what the 
results imply for trends in social capital, and for our theoretical understanding of the concept of 
social capital itself. We conclude by outlining a number of future avenues for interrogating the 
relationship between digital media and social capital production.  
 
Communication media and social capital 
Social capital can be considered an important social resource, as the presence of trust, interaction 
networks and norms of reciprocity allows societies to overcome collective action problems (Lin, 
2001; Putnam, 1993). In some of this literature, the emphasis is clearly on the role of networks, 
and patterns of interaction between citizens (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Glaeser et al., 2002; 
Lin, 2001). Other researchers, however, are much more inclined to define social capital much 
more strongly in attitudinal terms, whereby generalized trust is usually as the most important 
attitude that facilitates forms of cooperation and collective action (Putnam, 1993; Hooghe, 2007; 
Uslnaer, 2002). Within the literature, there is a strong debate about what can be considered as the 
sources or determinants of social capital (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003). State-oriented theories hold 
that the way society and political institutions function has a strong impact on the attitudes of the 
population. In this line of the literature it is assumed that states polices on redistribution have a 
positive effect on social capital, while it is assumed that the occurrence of corruption has an 
eroding effect (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Corrupt officials and institutions, for example, 
convey the message that people are not trustworthy, and that one therefore should be cautious in 
dealing with people in general, and not only with bureaucrats or those in power (Uslaner, 2002). 
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Society-oriented theories, on the other hand claim that the way citizens interact within society 
plays a crucial role in this regard.  
Most notably, Putnam (1993) argued that the way members interact with one another in 
voluntary associations leads to the development of generalized trust, and in turn this form of trust 
makes it easier to cooperate with others to promote collective goods. Although there is mixed 
evidence about the claim that voluntary associations have this effect (Hooghe & Quintelier, 
2013), it is clear that this approach builds mainly on the merits of close cooperation and face-to-
face contact. This classic conception of social capital proposes that because members interact 
with others, they learn to cooperate, reach a compromise, and in the long run this experience 
leads to internalizing new ‘habits of the heart’ that are conducive to pro-social behavior. Given 
the fact that this line of research situates the development of social capital mainly in individual 
behavior within networks, it is most suited for our specific research question on the impact of 
electronic media. This approach therefore understands the presence of social capital as a form of 
‘collective efficacy’: communities or neighborhoods where these resources are abundantly 
present will be able to deal more effectively with various challenges, like crime, unemployment, 
poverty and inequality (Sampson, Raudenbusch & Earls, 1997). There is indeed a whole research 
tradition showing that the presence of social capital is associated with positive outcomes with 
regard to mental health, school attendance, healthy behavior and even economic performance 
(Glaeser, Laibson & Sacerdote, 2002; Portes & Vickstrom, 2011).  
Our main research question about the effects of electronic communication on social 
capital indicators implies that individual level determinants are much more relevant for our 
purpose. Within this society-centered approach, the use of media indeed has received 
considerable attention. When Putnam wrote his seminal works on social capital, internet usage 
had not yet become widespread, and his references to digital media deal mainly with the effect of 
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television. For both media, however, the same causal logic is invoked. In Bowling Alone, Putnam 
named television as one of the main culprits for the erosion of social capital: 
‘it is precisely those Americans most marked by this dependence on televised 
entertainment who were most likely to have dropped out of civic and social life – who 
spent less time with friends, were less involved in community organizations, and were less 
likely to participate in public affairs (…) At the very least, television and its electronic 
cousins are willing accomplices in the civic mystery we have been unraveling, and more 
likely than not, they are ringleaders’ (Putnam, 2000, 246). 
 
Putnam here assumes that the new ‘electronic cousins’ of television will have the same, negative 
effect on social capital, mostly based on the presumption that the causal mechanisms that are at 
play for different media can be assumed to operate in the same manner.  
Three mechanisms stand out in this regard: time dislacement, privatization and 
socialization (Putnam, 2000, 237). The most obvious and intuitively appealing mechanism is one 
based on time displacement. Actors spend a substantial part of their leisure time on screen time, 
and this time is no longer available for social activities that are assumed to have a positive effect 
on the development of social capital (Hooghe, 2002; Shah, 1998). Those who spend extended 
periods of time in front of their television set will have less spare time available for activities that 
build social capital, such as community involvement or social activities (Moy, Scheufele & 
Holbert, 1999). Second, television can have an privatizing effect, as most television watching 
takes place in the private life-sphere, at home, with limited interaction with others. Therefore, 
television can contribute to the cultivation of a ‘mean world syndrome’, in which everything that 
happens outside the private individual lifeworld is seen as a potential source of threat (Gerbner, 
1998). This could induce heavy viewers to avoid further contact with the outside world, which is 
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seen as an increasingly hostile environment. Third, the content of television is also presumed to 
have a socializing effect. While entertainment programs can alienate actors from society, 
information programs can be a source of socially and politically relevant information that, in turn, 
can lead to various forms of civic engagement (Prior, 2007). However, even if we just focus on 
information programs, the precise content and the framing of the information too, can have an 
effect: as mainstream media depict an ever more cynical portrait of political life, the assumption 
is that this kind of media information will have a negative effect on attitudes like political trust, 
and may also adversely impact generalized trust and other components of social capital (Iyengar 
& Kinder, 2010; Mutz, 2007). 
All three mechanisms can also be applied to the internet. Especially among young age 
groups, a huge amount of time is spent on various forms of web-based activities and there is some 
concern that this time will no longer be available for other forms of leisure activity (Bouliane, 
2009; Robinson & Martin, 2009; Sinkkonen, Puhakka & Meriläinen, 2014). Second, internet 
applications allow users to select the information to which they are exposed, which may have an 
privatizing effect by reducing the scope of interaction and by limiting exposure to diverse 
orientations. Sunstein (2003) most notably expressed concern about the fact that actors will no 
longer be exposed to countervailing information, but that they would mainly seek information 
that reinforces their pre-existing attitudes and preferences (Warner, 2010). Finally, while some 
groups of the population use the internet mainly to retrieve information and to become informed, 
for a vast majority of users the internet is first and foremost a source of entertainment (van Dijk, 
2005). When media users are primarily focused on entertainment, the literature suggests that this 
media use will not stimulate various forms of civic engagement. 
The pessimistic claims in the original social capital literature were supported by early 
empirical studies (Nie, 2001; Nie and Erbring, 2002), but in the later literature most of these 
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initial concerns were qualified. The concerns about a ‘digital divide’ between those who do and 
do not have access to information have greatly decreased as access to computers and the internet 
has become more widespread. In the General Social Survey of 2012, 80.5 per cent of all 
respondents reported to have personally used a computer in any location, and an additional 14.9 
per cent of all respondents reported accessing the internet in their home through mobile devices. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that with regard to socio-economic status internet activism is 
even more strongly stratified than offline forms of participation (Oser, Hooghe & Marien, 2013).  
Beginning in the 1990s, empirical studies have successfully challenged claims in the 
social capital literature about the negative effect of media (e.g. McLeod, Scheufele & Moy, 
1999), and these critical studies have expanded over time. An early study led by Kraut (Kraut et 
al., 1998) claiming that internet is a social technology that reduces social connectivity was 
contradicted by a follow-up study that included panel data on the same respondents (Kraut et al., 
2002). More recent studies on the relationship between various kinds of internet use and social 
capital most often find a positive relationship (Dalton & Kittilson, 2012; Ellison, et al. 2007; 
Robinson & Martin, 2010; Shah et al. 2002; Shah et al. 2001). Numerous studies have shown that 
the internet can be a very strong mobilization tool (Mesch & Talmud, 2010; Valenzuela, 
Arriagada & Scherman, 2014). Indeed, a comprehensive meta-study of the effect of internet use 
on participation levels shows no general negative effect (Boulianne, 2009). Scholarship that 
focuses specifically on social media use suggests that even the opposite phenomenon occurs, as 
Facebook and other social media are effective tools for political communication and mobilization 
(Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Bimber, 2012; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela, 2012; Gil 
de Zúñiga, Molyneux & Zheng, forthcoming ; Robinson & Martin, 2010). Bennett and Segerberg 
(2013) have strongly argued that the internet does not function only as a mobilization tool for 
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traditional forms of participation, but should also be taken seriously as a new, ‘connective’ form 
of engagement and community. 
Despite this largely optimistic research on the positive impact of specific social media 
applications, research on other social impacts of internet usage tends to highlight the negative 
impact of ‘screen time’ in general (Turkle, 2011). The proliferation of internet usage, as well as 
the supply of digital media and television content has changed in various ways that have garnered 
public concern. The negative social and public health impacts of screen time – measured as the 
amount of time that one spends engaging with television and varied digital media – has gained 
attention in public health research on topics as varied as neurological development, adolescent 
social development, attention deficit disorders, aging and obesity (Banks, 2011; Council on 
Communications and Media, 2013). The concept of screen time considers television and digital 
media to be interchangeable time units with equally nefarious effects, and has gained popular 
attention by social media leaders such as Arianna Huffington (2014) in her call for the need for 
periodic ‘digital detoxes’. The popularly discussed guidelines from the American Academy of 
Pediatrics that warn parents of young children to limit screen time do not differentiate between 
whether this screen is a television screen that lacks user interaction, or whether it is an interactive 
screen (Carey, 2011).  
Recent societal trends and public health research therefore support the analogy suggested 
by Putnam that television and digital media should be considered as ‘electronic cousins’ with 
similar negative impacts. It is time, therefore, to ascertain whether the pessimistic claims of the 
social capital literature are still valid in the current era. In contrast to a number of recent studies 
(Conroy, Feezell & Guerrero, 2009; Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2011; Mesch & Talmud, 2010), 
we do not limit the analysis to specific social media use; rather, we cover the time spent on all 
forms of internet usage. The ambition of this study, however, goes further than merely updating 
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an analysis of two decades ago. It has been stated that face-to-face interaction is essential to build 
trust among interaction partners (Campellone & Kring, 2013). If the current analysis would show 
that the internet does not inhibit the development of social capital, this would imply that physical 
proximity is not a necessary condition for the creation of social capital (Hampton & Wellman, 
2003; Mesch & Talmud, 2010), and that other causal mechanisms need to be investigated. 
In line with the original literature of the 1990s, the basic hypotheses leading our analysis 
is that both watching television and being active on the internet will have similar negative effects 
on the attitudinal and behavioral components of social capital. 
 
 
 
Data and Operationalization 
One of the key challenges for research on the internet’s social impact is the limitations of data 
quality for measuring specific online activities (Hargittai, 2005; Karpf, 2012). It is not surprising 
therefore that research on social media use has often taken advantage of student samples in single 
geographic locations that are not generalizable to the American population as a whole (Ellison et 
al. 2007; Pasek et al. 2009; Valenzuela et al. 2009). While these studies provide important 
insights on social media usage among specific populations, they cannot be used to address the 
research questions of the present study. 
The General Social Survey (GSS) of 2012 is a uniquely rich dataset for testing our 
hypotheses since it includes a number of extensive batteries of questions on behavioral and 
attitudinal measures of social capital. Since the GSS is a standard-bearer for high-quality, 
nationally representative survey (Marsden, 2012) this 2012 battery of questions provides a timely 
opportunity to investigate the contemporary relevance of classic social capital theory. In addition 
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to measures of different aspects of social capital, the GSS 2012 also includes information on the 
amount of time respondents devote to internet usage and to television viewing, estimated in hours 
per week. It has to be acknowledged that these are quite broad categories, that do not allow us 
further distinction about how exactly the internet has been used. Hargittai (2005) has delivered a 
strong criticism with regard to the broad categories on internet use that are included in the GSS. 
While theoretically we follow much of these critical arguments, we are confronted with the data 
limitations of GSS and we would consider it a loss if these high quality and representative data 
source for this reason no longer would be used to address this highly relevant research question. 
There is a clear trade-off in using these data: while they are unique in providing representative 
population data, they are surely lacking in sufficient detail in the measurement of internet use. 
Although more detailed measures of the nature of internet usage and the content of television 
viewing are not available, these data provide a unique opportunity for assessing whether 
respondents’ amount of internet usage and television watching are indeed ‘electronic cousins’ in 
terms of their relationship with levels of social capital. An additional advantage of these data for 
investigating determinants of social capital is that they serve as an ideal basis for comparison with 
the Bowling Alone argument, which also took advantage of GSS data for examining social capital 
(Putnam 2000, 419-424).  
The GSS in 2012 investigated three main aspects of social capital: generalized trust, 
socializing, and generosity or pro-social behavior. These three series of indicators represent 
different aspects of social capital and they have internal consistency appropriate for use as three 
separate dependent variables in multivariate regressions. Generalized trust is the most frequently 
used indicator for the attitudinal component of social capital (van Deth, 2008; van Ingen & 
Bekkers, forthcoming). Generalized trust can be characterized as the expectation that most others 
that one encounters in daily life are trustworthy, and this assumption enables actors to cooperate 
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with others (Putnam 1993, 172). Socializing refers to ‘schmoozing’ behavior (Putnam 2000, 93), 
while actors spend time in various forms of informal face-to-face interaction. The expectation is 
that this form of informal socializing leads to the development of stronger community ties 
(Uslaner, 2002, 119). Finally we include a scale with various forms of pro-social behavior, 
ranging from offering a seat to a stranger to giving money to the homeless. In this scale we limit 
ourselves to self-reported behavior, and we do not make any theoretical claims about the 
motivation for this behavior.  
This comprehensive operationalization of social capital follows the line of Putnam’s 
original measurement which included a wide variety of actions: ‘Altruism, volunteering, and 
philanthropy – our readiness to help others – is by some interpretations a central measure of 
social capital (…). Thus any assessment of trends in social capital must include an examination of 
trends in volunteering, philanthropy, and altruism’ (Putnam, 2000, 116, 117). While Putnam 
measured these indicators independently, in this analysis we will take the step to ascertain 
whether these behaviors respond to one latent factor, and fit the notion of pro-social behavior that 
is generally used in developmental psychology (Eisenberg, 1982). On theoretical grounds, one 
could debate whether the acts that are included in this scale should be labeled as altruism or as 
forms of reciprocity. Most likely looking after the pet of the neighbors includes an element of 
reciprocity, but for most people giving money to the homeless amounts to altruism, without any 
expectation of reciprocal behavior. These acts clearly refer to forms of pro-social behavior 
(Eisenberg, Cameron, Tryon & Dodez, 1981; Frey & Meier, 2004) or generosity in daily 
interaction. Furthermore, it can be observed that all these actions form one scale with quite strong 
internal coherence (Cronach’s alpha: .71), so that we can validly construct a scale on pro-social or 
generous behavior. Table 1 details the construction of these three scales (see Appendix for full 
survey question text). 
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[Table 1 About Here] 
 
Screen time is measured by three distinct questions in the GSS: amount of time per week 
on email; amount of time per week on the Web in addition to emailing; and amount of time per 
day watching television. All three screen time measures are not ‘continuous’ in the sense that 
they cannot take on an infinite number of values. Rather, they are interval variables that have a 
similar functional form that is highly skewed due to a relatively large number of respondents who 
invest little or no time in these activities, along with a relatively large group of ‘super-users’ who 
invest many hours in digital technologies. The skewed distribution of the variables prevents us 
from using them directly in the analysis. A standard procedure therefore, would be to use a log 
transformation, but even in that case, the distribution of these variables does not approach 
normality, which means that a recoded ordered variable is more likely to yield interpretable and 
reliable information on the effect of increased screen time on social capital (Long & Freese, 
2014). In the analyses reported in the article we therefore present analyses that use a recoded five-
categorical variable for the screen time indicators, with the respondents divided in five equal 
groups (see Appendix for frequencies). In addition, the appendix documents findings that use 
alternate codings of the screen time variables, and we reference these findings in our summary of 
the results, so that it is clear that results are not just the result of the coding decisions we 
implemented. 
A number of standard control variables are used in the analyses (Putnam 2000, 419): 
gender (0=male, 44.9%; 1=female, 55.1%); age, in years (M=48.2, range 18 to 89); years of 
education (M=13.5, S.D.=3.13, range 0 to 20), income (25 categories, ranging from those earning 
$1,000 per year to those earning more than $150,000 per year, M=$30-35,000/yr); religious 
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service attendance (0=none or less than once a month, 53.8%; 1=once a month or more, 45.8%); 
and size of location (logged form of a continuous measure of the number of inhabitants in 
respondents’ location).1 The GSS 2012 total sample size is 1,974 but the sample size for each 
analysis differs due to the GSS’s use of a split-ballot design. Since 1988 the GSS has used a split-
ballot design that implements three different versions of the survey for three different random 
sub-samples of respondents (GSS 2014a, 2014b). The differing sample sizes for different 
analyses therefore results from the fact that the three different versions of the GSS 2012 
questionnaire did not all include a full battery of the social capital and digital technology 
indicators. 
 
Results 
The bivariate relationships between the various digital technologies and the social capital 
measures, without controls, suggest that greater internet usage is generally associated with higher 
levels of social capital, whereas longer hours of television watching is generally associated with 
lower levels of social capital. In the analysis, we first report on a model with only control 
variables, before introducing one by one the independent variables of theoretical interest to our 
study. Tables 2 through 4 show that in the ordinary least squares regression analyses with 
appropriate controls the relationship between digital technologies and social capital is not always 
statistically significant.
2
 The findings indicate, however, that television watching and internet 
usage certainly cannot be summarized under the same general notion of screen time. 
                                                          
1
. Although some studies consider religious participation as a component of social capital itself, 
in thus study we follow standard practice by considering it as a determinant of social capital 
levels. 
2
. When combined in the same model, the digital technology indicators are invalidated by high 
levels of multicollinearity, as indicated by following the strict guideline that multicollinearity is a 
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[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Regarding generalized trust, the findings in Table 2 suggest that when the relationship 
between internet usage and generalized trust is significant, the evidence indicates that greater 
internet usage is generally associated with higher levels of generalized trust. In contrast, when the 
relationship between generalized trust and television watching is significant, those who watch 
more television have lower levels of generalized trust.
3
 The results are in line with earlier 
findings, as they show that the highly educated and older respondents in general have higher 
levels of trust.  
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
concern when the mean variance inflation factor considerably exceeds one (e.g. Chatterjee & 
Hadi, 2012). When all three indicators are included in the model, the mean VIF is 1.72, which is 
an increase of at least 43% in the mean VIF in comparison to models in which the digital 
technology indicators are assessed separately. Similarly, when two of the three indicators are 
included in the model the mean VIF is at least 1.50, which is an increase of at least 25% in the 
mean VIF in comparison to models in which the digital technology indicators are assessed 
separately. The digital technology indicators are therefore included in separate models.  
3
. Kernel density plots of the generalized trust mean scale measure indicate deviation from 
normality that may be better analyzed through ordinal logit. We conducted an additional ordinal 
logit analysis for generalized trust in which the dependent variable was coded as a summary 
measure of the dichotomous trust variables (0=no; 1=yes). The substantive findings are consistent 
with the OLS findings presented in Table 2, and are available from the authors. 
17 
 
 
Regarding socializing, the findings also suggest a positive relationship between internet 
usage and this indicator for social capital. Table 3 shows that when the relationship between 
socializing and internet usage is significant, greater internet usage is associated with greater 
socializing, whereas TV has no significant relationship with socializing. This finding challenges 
concerns that those who are most active online are ‘tuning out’ from face-to-face social 
engagement, and instead suggest that online communication and internet usage are consonant 
with being socially engaged with family, friends and neighbors. Those who are using the internet 
more than two hours a day prove to be the most avid socializers in the ‘offline’ world as well. 
Here we observe that younger respondents are apparently more eager to socialize than older 
respondents.  
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
Regarding pro-social behavior as a dependent variable, the findings in Table 4 show that 
with proper controls there is no significant relationship between internet usage and pro-social 
behavior, whereas longer hours of television watching are associated with lower levels of pro-
social behavior. Concern about the eroding effects of television on basic civility is clearly 
supported here. The analysis furthermore shows that this pro-social behavior is more prevalent 
among older and religious respondents. 
In sum, the findings show that internet usage and television watching do not have the 
same consistent relationship with various measures of social capital. This can also be 
demonstrated in an indirect manner: if we perform the same analysis again, this time including all 
these measurements together in one indicator for ‘screen time’, this analysis only leads to non-
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significant results as apparently the positive effects of internet use and the negative ones of 
watching television cancel each other out. This additional analysis (results available from the 
authors) clearly indicates that it does not make sense to lump internet use and television use 
together in this kind of analysis. In general, the relationship between various measures of social 
capital and digital technologies is fairly weak, and not consistently statistically significant. The 
relatively weak relationship between the digital technologies and social capital in these analyses 
is evident given the limited effect size while they also do not contribute that much to the 
explained variance of the models. It can also be noted in the various models that introducing the 
screen variables does not change all that much in the size of the effects of the control variables. 
Clearly the relationship between digital technologies and elements of social capital is not 
a powerfully strong relationship that could justify naming any of these media as ‘ringleaders’ in 
their effect on social capital. However, it is noteworthy that when the relationship between digital 
technologies and social capital is significant, the findings suggest that greater internet usage is 
associated with higher levels of social capital, whereas more time spent watching television is 
associated with lower levels of social capital. Not for a single indicator is there a significant 
negative relationship between internet use and social capital indicators. As documented in the 
appendix (Tables A2 through A5), this overall pattern holds even when alternate forms of the 
screen time variables are used in the analyses, although the effects are usually weaker, which 
might indicate that the skewed distribution of these variables indeed does not make them ideal 
candidates for this kind of analysis. In contrast to the expectations of classic social capital theory, 
the findings provide no support for a significant negative relationship between internet use and 
social capital indicators of any kind. 
While in general the results of these analyses are clear, we must repeat here the caveat that 
the measurement of digital technology usage is limited in the General Social Survey. For 
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television, the GSS measurement allows for a control of overall time measurement, but not for 
viewing content. Also for web use, the GSS only allows for a control of overall time investment, 
even though there are huge differences with regard to the way people actually spend their time 
online. Yet, the findings indicate that even with this blunt measure, those who use the web for 
longer hours seem to be using it in ways that foster social connectivity. This finding is consistent 
with recent research that uses more fine-grained indicators of internet usage to identify the 
connective capabilities of internet use, particularly if used in intentionally interactive ways. Bode 
(2012) for example, has shown that specific forms of using the social network site Facebook are 
positively related to community engagement. Gibson and McAllister (2013), furthermore, show 
that internet networks with actors that one also knows on a face-to-face basis tend to promote 
various forms of political participation.  
 
Discussion 
This article aims to present new insights on the proposed importance of in-person and 
electronically mediated interaction for social capital. Our results should serve as a caution not to 
use older writings to assess the current social impact of internet use, as during the past decade the 
increased prevalence of internet usage has dramatically changed Americans’ daily lives. In the 
GSS, 20% of all respondents spend 24 hours or more per week on the internet, including email 
use; and an additional 20% are spending between 11 and 23 hours a week. The results, however, 
indicate that this massive time investment in internet use does not have detrimental effects on 
conventional social capital indicators. On the contrary, as our results suggest, when there is a 
significant relationship between internet use and elements of social capital, it is a positive 
relationship. This finding implies that those using the internet the most intensively seem to devote 
some of their web time to activities that foster social networks. This is almost self-evident for 
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emailing where one needs to have an interaction partner with whom to correspond. But also for 
other forms of internet use, we did not find any negative relationship with elements of social 
capital.  
The findings in this article make it clear that the bold claim that electronic activity is the 
‘ringleader’ in a mystery of declining social capital is not supported. To what degree online 
interactivity may foster social capital requires further research. Sander and Putnam (2010) 
acknowledge changes in forms of civic engagement, but they remain skeptical about the social 
relevance of new social networking tools like Facebook: “Measured against the arc of history, 
such technological civic invention is in its infancy. In a world where Facebook ‘friendship’ can 
encompass people who have never actually met, we remain agnostic about whether Internet social 
entrepreneurs have found the right mix of virtual and real strands to replace traditional social ties” 
(2010, 15). Based on the results of our analysis, we can confidently say that in the United States 
in 2012, those who spend more time using the internet seem to be finding a virtual mix that is 
supportive of social capital. In sum, the specter of isolated nerds who are tied to their electronic 
devices, and thus are disconnected from the real world, is obviously not as widespread as is often 
feared. 
The current study’s use of a high-quality, nationally-represented survey is an important 
contribution to the study of social capital, particularly in light of the burgeoning trend in the 
literature to home in on increasingly specific internet platform usages. It is almost self-evident 
that social media use is related to other forms of social activity, due to the nature of this form of 
interaction. In the current study, we include all forms of internet use, including those forms that 
do not directly lead to interaction with others. At the same time, it is worth repeating that the 
General Social Survey’s measurement of the independent variables was rather limited. Given the 
broad measurements of internet use in the survey and the ubiquity of internet usage in 
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contemporary American society, it is all the more impressive that this measure is associated with 
a positive effect on social capital. An additional insight from the present study is that there is no 
exogenous ‘screen time’ effect at play, by which those who spend time in the glow of media 
screens of any kind have a positive social capital payoff. Television and internet use clearly have 
opposite effects, and bringing them together in a broad measurement of screen time simply 
cancels out these effects. The findings in the present study provide evidence in support of the 
finding that internet usage, broadly defined, is positively associated with social capital measures 
for American society. These findings therefore emphasize the importance of future research using 
survey data with more extended measurements in order to use rigorous empirical methods to the 
causal mechanisms in the relationship between internet usage and social capital. 
 
One of the perennial forms of critique against the social capital literature is that it 
essentially outdated. Most of the indicators used in the Bowling Alone volume refer to quite 
traditional activities, like family dinners, joining local voluntary associations, or activity in 
religious groups. This had led to the criticism that the early social capital literature was overly 
concerned with a ‘world we have lost’. In this lost world, there is a distinct preference for face-to-
face interaction, and other kinds of connectedness are easily dismissed. The current analysis 
suggests that internet-mediated forms of interaction through email and the web are important 
sources of interpersonal engagement, and that face-to-face contact is not the only way to foster 
social capital. This can explain the difference we observed between television and the internet: 
while internet usage is positively related to some forms of connectedness, this is not the case for 
television. Or to put it differently: not all ‘screen time’ has the same effect. Technological 
evolutions apparently have reduced the need for physical proximity, without any negative effects 
on trust or engagement. Numerous people use the internet to stay informed about what happens in 
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the community, to stay in contact with friends and family members that do not live close by, or to 
express their opinion on topics important to them. While all of these activities in the past might 
have required a physical presence or closeness, this is no longer the case.  
In future research, it is important to include more information on the precise activity that 
respondents perform on the internet. Email correspondence, for example, seems to have an 
equally strong positive effect on social capital as general web use. Theoretically this is a relevant 
finding, because it provides evidence for the claim that social capital is increased by interpersonal 
communication, and the trusting relations embedded in these networks. As the interactive 
capacities of the internet continue to become more refined and more widely used, it is possible 
that television and digital medias (at least in some form) will no longer be considered even 
‘distant relatives’ in terms of their potential impact on social capital. More generally, there is no 
good theoretical reason to express a preference for a specific form or medium for online 
networks, as they will evolve over time, depending on technological and structural changes in 
society. While half a century ago, meeting in locally-based voluntary associations was perhaps 
the most important form of networking, in the current era various other forms of networking have 
become available and they seem to have similar positive effects.  
The current developments with regard to internet-based communication pose a number of 
additional challenges for future research on this topic. First, it will be important to investigate 
how much of respondents’ online usage is taking place on different kinds of devices, such as 
computers versus mobile phones. For example, research on social capital in Japan (Ikeda, Richey, 
& Teresi 2013) suggests that computer use (with much more information being processed) is 
positively related to political participation, while there is a negative relation with use of mobile 
devices, which tends to be more limited with regard to information transfer. This study on social 
capital in Japan suggests that future research on the device through which people access the 
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internet may yield greater insight into the relationship between digital technologies and social 
capital in the United States. An advantage might be that smartphone use seems to be limiting the 
digital divide for a number of groups that are traditionally low in their online usage but are 
quickly gaining access through their smartphones: low-income, non-white, young, and less-
educated citizens (Duggan & Smith, 2013). A related complication, self-evidently, is the rapid 
proliferation of different technological carriers for the same kind of content, and this will make 
this kind of research much more difficult to perform in the near future. 
Second, a connected avenue of research is to investigate how exactly internet users focus 
on creating, maintaining, and/or strengthening relationships. On the one hand, internet usage can 
help to consolidate already existing bonding networks, most likely with other actors who have 
similar demographic backgrounds. On the other hand, however, it is also likely that new 
technologies facilitate the construction of broader and more diverse networks, including 
interaction partners that one normally would not encounter on a routine basis. One of the possible 
venues for future research is to investigate to what extent the distinction that is traditionally made 
between face-to-face contact and electronically mediated contact is still valid in the current era. 
We know that internet content is often discussed and shared in face-to-face interaction settings, so 
this too needs to be investigated as a possible mechanism for a spill-over effect. 
These avenues of research may even strengthen the social capital argument by making 
sure it is no longer connected to one specific, and to some extent outdated, form of network 
formation. The way in which we create networks is obviously no longer the same as the 
inhabitants of the city-state of Firenze did during the Renaissance, or as the generation of our 
parents did a few decades ago. It seems plausible that what matters most for the production of 
social capital are interpersonal networks, regardless of the exact form, as predicted by some of the 
older theoretical literature on social capital (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; Coleman, 1988). As screen 
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time continues to gain a negative connotation in popular culture, the present study supports the 
need for rigorous and creative research designs to investigate the complex relationship between 
the person viewing the screen, and the potential networks this person may create, maintain, or 
strengthen. 
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Table 1. Operationalization of Measures of Social Capital 
 (1) Generalized trust 
People are not trustworthy (1); Depends (2); People are trustworthy (3)  
     Indicators (n=1314) Means 
     -People are fair 2.10 
     -People are helpful 2.00 
     -General trust 1.69 
Cronbach’s alpha: .686 
 Mean generalized trust scale: M=1.93, SD=0.75, range 1 to 3 
 (2) Socializing   
How often: (1) = never (7) = almost every day 
      Indicators (n=1294) Means 
     -Go to a bar or tavern 2.36 
     -Spend a social evening with friends who live outside your neighborhood 4.02 
     -Spend a social evening with someone who lives in your neighborhood 3.27 
     -Spend a social evening with relatives 4.56 
Cronbach’s alpha: .505 
 Mean socializing scale: M=3.55, SD=1.13, range 1 to 6.75   
(3) Pro-social Behavior 
Frequency in past year: (1) = not at all (6) = more than once a week 
     Indicators  (n=1244) Means 
     -Carried strangers’ belongings 1.88 
     -Let a stranger cut ahead of you in line  3.23 
     -Has given directions to a stranger  2.97 
     -Gave blood  1.17 
     -Gave charity 2.68 
     -Gave food or money to homeless person 2.51 
     -Offered seat to a stranger  1.95 
     -Looked after plant or pet of others 2.07 
     -Helped someone outside of household with housework or shopping 2.59 
     -Helped somebody to find a job 2.16 
     -Returned money after getting too much change 1.63 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.713 
Mean generosity scale: M=2.25, SD=0.61, range 1 to 4.9 
Note: Principal component analyses and scree plots for each battery of indicators support the construction 
of a single scale for each of these measures of social capital. 
Source: General Social Survey 2012.  
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Table 2. Digital Technologies and Generalized Trust  
 (0) (1) (2) (3) 
 Controls Email Web TV 
Email usage/week     
1 hour  0.242**   
  (0.114)   
2 hours  0.041   
  (0.129)   
3-8 hours  0.142   
  (0.095)   
9 hours+  0.139   
  (0.104)   
Web usage/week     
1-2 hours   0.171  
   (0.112)  
3-6 hours   0.142  
   (0.107)  
7-14 hours   0.145  
   (0.118)  
15 hours+   0.199*  
   (0.107)  
TV viewing/day     
2 hours    0.011 
    (0.089) 
3 hours    -0.032 
    (0.104) 
4 hours    0.023 
    (0.127) 
5 hours+    -0.213* 
    (0.119) 
Gender (1=female) -0.012 0.013 0.029 0.037 
 (0.046) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) 
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Income 0.018*** 0.016** 0.020*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Religious attendance 0.009 -0.032 -0.038 -0.026 
 (0.046) (0.067) (0.069) (0.066) 
Location size (log) 0.006 0.030** 0.035** 0.025 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.238* 0.209 0.110 0.266 
 (0.129) (0.200) (0.207) (0.215) 
Observations (n) 1,181 571 554 598 
R-squared 0.171 0.175 0.180 0.181 
Note: Dependent variable: mean scale of generalized trust. Ordinary least squares regression, 
unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories for email 
use, web use and TV watching are the first quintile for each variable. R-squared for model with socio-
demographic controls only: 0.171. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
33 
 
Table 3. Digital Technologies and Socializing  
 (0) (1) (2) (3) 
 Controls Email Web TV 
Email usage/week     
1 hour  0.093   
  (0.122)   
2 hours  0.206   
  (0.128)   
3-8 hours  0.260**   
  (0.112)   
9 hours+  0.235**   
  (0.114)   
Web usage/week     
1-2 hours   0.247**  
   (0.122)  
3-6 hours   0.269**  
   (0.130)  
7-14 hours   0.079  
   (0.136)  
15 hours+   0.294**  
   (0.130)  
TV viewing/day     
2 hours    0.021 
    (0.097) 
3 hours    0.093 
    (0.113) 
4 hours    0.114 
    (0.112) 
5 hours+    -0.105 
    (0.123) 
Gender (1=female) -0.067 -0.082 -0.060 -0.066 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) 
Age -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.043*** 0.030** 0.035** 0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Income -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Religious attendance 0.037 0.027 0.018 0.032 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) 
Location size (log) -0.026 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Constant 4.264*** 4.302*** 4.155*** 4.275*** 
 (0.219) (0.225) (0.234) (0.242) 
Observations (n) 1,155 1,105 1,071 1,154 
R-squared 0.123 0.128 0.130 0.127 
Note: Dependent variable: mean scale of socializing. Ordinary least squares regression, 
unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories for email 
use, web use and TV watching are the first quintile for each variable. R-squared for model with socio-
demographic controls only: 0.124. Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Digital Technologies and Pro-social Behavior  
 (0) (1) (2) (3) 
 Controls Email Web TV 
Email usage/week     
1 hour  0.051   
  (0.099)   
2 hours  0.172   
  (0.126)   
3-8 hours  -0.014   
  (0.080)   
9 hours+  0.135   
  (0.096)   
Web usage/week     
1-2 hours   0.032  
   (0.117)  
3-6 hours   -0.050  
   (0.116)  
7-14 hours   -0.042  
   (0.127)  
15 hours+   -0.016  
   (0.117)  
TV viewing/day     
2 hours    -0.012 
    (0.085) 
3 hours    -0.085 
    (0.082) 
4 hours    -0.203** 
    (0.090) 
5 hours+    -0.161 
    (0.108) 
Gender (1=female) -0.045 -0.077 -0.069 -0.075 
 (0.042) (0.062) (0.062) (0.058) 
Age -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.032*** 0.021 0.025** 0.021* 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Income -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Religious attendance 0.116*** 0.196*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 
 (0.042) (0.060) (0.061) (0.057) 
Location size (log) 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.024 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 2.052*** 2.092*** 2.081*** 2.192*** 
 (0.136) (0.212) (0.239) (0.221) 
Observations (n) 1,136 534 517 556 
R-squared 0.064 0.078 0.066 0.082 
 Note: Dependent variable: mean scale of pro-social behavior. Ordinary least squares regression, 
unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories for email 
use, web use and TV watching are the first quintile for each variable. R-squared for model with socio-
demographic controls only: 0.064 Sig: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
 
GSS 2012 Survey questions 
 
Digital Technology Usage 
 
Indicator Survey text 
Email usage 
 
‘About how many minutes or hours per week do you spend sending and 
answering electronic mail or e-mail?’ 
Web usage (in 
addition to email)  
 
‘Not counting e-mail, about how many minutes or hours per week do you 
use the Web? Include time you spend visiting regular web sites and time 
spent using interactive Internet services like chat rooms, Usenet groups, 
discussion forums, bulletin boards, and the like.’ 
TV watching 
 
‘On the average day, about how many hours do you personally watch 
television?’ 
 
 
Frequencies of Digital Technology Indicators: 
Email usage Freq. 
0 hour 478 
1 hour 186 
2 hours 106 
3-8 hours 240 
9 hours+ 233 
Total 1,243 
  Web usage Freq. 
0 hours 274 
1-2 hours 215 
3-6 hours 271 
7-14 hours 209 
15 hours+ 235 
Total 1,204 
  TV watching Freq. 
0-1 hour 345 
2 hours 325 
3 hours 238 
4 hours 171 
5 hours+ 219 
Total 1,298 
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Social capital indicators 
Note: all indicators recoded for analyses so that higher categories are higher in social capital. 
 
(1) Generalized Trust 
 
Indicator Survey text 
People are fair ‘Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got a chance, or would they try to be fair?’ 
People are helpful ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that 
they are mostly just looking out for themselves?’ 
General trust ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?’  
 
(2) Socializing 
 
‘Tell me which answer comes closest to how often you do the following thing…’ 
Categories: (1) Almost every day (2) Once or twice a week (3) Several times a month (4) About 
once a month (5) Several times a year (6) About once a year (7) Never 
 
Indicator 
‘Go to a bar or tavern?’ 
‘Spend a social evening with friends who live outside your neighborhood?’ 
‘Spend a social evening with someone who lives inside your neighborhood?’ 
‘Spend a social evening with relatives?’ 
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(3) Pro-social Activities 
 
‘During the past 12 months, how often have you done each of the following things:’ 
Categories: (1) More than once a week (2) Once a week (3) Once a month (4) At least 2 or 3 
times in the past year (5) Once in the past year (6) Not at all in the past year. 
 
Indicators 
‘Carried a stranger's belongings, like groceries, a suitcase, or shopping bag?’ 
‘Allowed a stranger to go ahead of you in line?’ 
‘Given directions to a stranger?’ 
‘Donated blood?’ 
‘Given money to a charity?’ 
‘Given food or money to a homeless person?’ 
‘Offered your seat on a bus or in a public place to a stranger who was standing?’ 
‘Looked after a person's plants, mail, or pets while they were away?’ 
‘Helped someone outside of your household with housework or shopping?’ 
‘Helped somebody to find a job’ 
‘Returned money to a cashier after getting too much change?’ 
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Table A2a. Digital Technologies (as interval variables) and Generalized Trust  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week -0.002   
 (0.003)   
Web usage/week  -0.002  
  (0.002)  
TV viewing/day   -0.020* 
   (0.011) 
Gender (1=female) 0.030 0.034 0.031 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) 
Age 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Income 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Religious attendance -0.025 -0.037 -0.025 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.066) 
Location size (log) 0.031* 0.034** 0.027* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.188 0.173 0.275 
 (0.199) (0.204) (0.207) 
    
Observations (n)  571 554 598 
R-squared 0.165 0.175 0.175 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A2b. Digital Technologies (as logged variables) and Generalized Trust  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week 0.024   
 (0.033)   
Web usage/week  0.030  
  (0.031)  
TV viewing/day   -0.101 
   (0.061) 
Gender (1=female) 0.027 0.035 0.031 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) 
Age 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Income 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Religious attendance -0.028 -0.036 -0.025 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.066) 
Location size (log) 0.031** 0.035** 0.027* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
    
Constant 0.207 0.127 0.335 
 (0.199) (0.206) (0.226) 
    
Observations (n) 571 554 598 
R-squared 0.165 0.176 0.175 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
39 
 
Table A3a. Digital Technologies (as interval variables) and Socializing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week 0.006*   
 (0.003)   
Web usage/week  0.002  
  (0.003)  
TV viewing/day   -0.006 
   (0.013) 
Gender (1=female) -0.073 -0.060 -0.067 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) 
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Income -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Religious attendance 0.023 0.021 0.035 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) 
Location size (log) -0.027 -0.030 -0.026 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Constant 4.249*** 4.240*** 4.300*** 
 (0.223) (0.230) (0.236) 
    
Observations (n) 1,105 1,071 1,154 
R-squared 0.124 0.121 0.124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A3b. Digital Technologies (as logged  variables) and Socializing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week 0.095***   
 (0.033)   
Web usage/week  0.054  
  (0.035)  
TV viewing/day   -0.027 
   (0.065) 
Gender (1=female) -0.076 -0.060 -0.066 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) 
Age -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.031** 0.038** 0.043*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Income -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Religious attendance 0.023 0.025 0.035 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) 
Location size (log) -0.029 -0.030 -0.026 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Constant 4.302*** 4.189*** 4.313*** 
 (0.223) (0.232) (0.254) 
    
Observations (n) 1,105 1,071 1,154 
R-squared 0.128 0.123 0.124 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A4a. Digital Technologies (as interval variables) and Pro-social Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week 0.003   
 (0.002)   
Web usage/week  -0.002  
  (0.002)  
TV viewing/day   -0.028** 
   (0.014) 
Gender (1=female) -0.070 -0.075 -0.080 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.058) 
Age -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.023* 0.025** 0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Income 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Religious attendance 0.185*** 0.206*** 0.176*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) 
Location size (log) 0.021 0.025 0.023 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 2.083*** 2.076*** 2.204*** 
 (0.208) (0.216) (0.205) 
    
Observations (n) 534 517 556 
R-squared 0.072 0.066 0.078 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A4b. Digital Technologies (as logged variables) and Pro-social Behavior 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Email Web TV 
Email usage/week 0.031   
 (0.029)   
Web usage/week  -0.013  
  (0.031)  
TV viewing/day   -0.126** 
   (0.061) 
Gender (1=female) -0.067 -0.072 -0.078 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) 
Age -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education 0.021* 0.025** 0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Income -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Religious attendance 0.189*** 0.206*** 0.177*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) 
Location size (log) 0.021 0.024 0.024 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 2.096*** 2.078*** 2.277*** 
 (0.209) (0.229) (0.222) 
    
Observations (n) 534 517 556 
R-squared 0.070 0.064 0.080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5. Results Comparison Based on Alternate Forms of Screen Time Indicators 
Effect on Generalized Trust 
Functional form of 
screen time variable 
Email Web TV 
Ordered categorical Positive Positive Negative 
Interval (Not significant) (Not significant) Negative 
Logged  (Not significant) (Not significant) (Not significant) 
 
Effect on Socializing 
Functional form of 
screen time variable 
Email Web TV 
Ordered categorical Positive Positive (Not significant) 
Interval Positive (Not significant) (Not significant) 
Logged  Positive (Not significant) (Not significant) 
 
Effect on Pro-Social Behavior 
Functional form of 
screen time variable 
Email Web TV 
Ordered categorical (Not significant) (Not significant) Negative 
Interval (Not significant) (Not significant) Negative 
Logged  (Not significant) (Not significant) Negative 
 
 
